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1. INTRODUCTION	
	
Community-based	projects	are	a	popular	policy	tool	for	developing	countries.	
Most	of	them	aim	at	improving	the	delivery	of	a	public	good,	usually	by	encouraging	
community	mobilization.	The	advocates	of	this	participatory	approach	argue	that	it	
strengthens	 the	 civic	 capacity	 of	 communities,	 empowering	 them	 to	 lead	 changes	
necessary	 for	 development.	 General	 disappointment	 with	 top-down	 policy	 led	 the	
World	Bank	to	make	them	into	a	cornerstone	in	the	fight	against	poverty	(Mansuri	
and	 Rao,	 2004).	 Yet,	 the	 evidence	 on	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 community-based	
development	projects	is	scarce	and	rather	mixed	(Miguel	and	Gugerty	2007;	Olken,	
2007).	
	
Using	 a	 series	 of	 experiments	 conducted	 in	 the	 field,	 we	 study	 how	 a	
community’s	capacity	to	act	collectively	to	produce	a	public	good	may	be	improved	
by	communication	and	leadership.		
 
Evidence	from	 laboratory	experiments	show	that	 the	 free	riding	problem	is	
not	as	prevalent	as	standard	economic	theory	predicts,	see	Ledyard	(1995),	Zelmer	
(2003)	and	Chaudhuri	 (2011)	 for	reviews.	These	findings	suggest	that	agents	may	
not	only	care	about	their	monetary	payoffs,	but	also	about	others’	actions,	payoffs	or	
welfare.	Another	robust	finding	in	the	experimental	literature	on	cooperation	is	that	
contributions	 are	 sensitive	 to	 design	 features.	 Communication,	 either	 between	
players	or	mediated	by	a	specific	individual,	is	found	to	increase	contributions	to	the	
public	good	(Isaac	and	Walker,	1988;	Sally,	1995;	Cason	and	Khan,	2008).		
	
However,	 evidence	 from	 the	 field	 is	 scarcer,	 especially	 from	 developing	
countries.	 Cardenas	 and	 Carpenter	 (2008)	 point	 out	 to	 two	 shortcomings	 of	 the	
evidence	 collected	 so	 far	 on	 games	 played	 in	 the	 field.	 First,	 the	 relevance	 of	
empirical	 findings	 is	 expected	 to	 increase	 with	 external	 validity.	 They	 recommend	
not	 only	 making	 the	 sample	 more	 representative,	 but	 also	 showing	 how	
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experimental	 findings	 relate	 to	 the	 economic	 decisions	 of	 the	 poor.	 	 Second,	 the	
authors	argue	for	more	policy-oriented	research.		
	
We	 designed	 and	 conducted	 a	 series	 of	 experimental	 games	 over	 121	
communities	 in	 rural	 Mali.	 These	 communities	 were	 selected	 to	 benefit	 from	 a	
sanitation	 program	 designed	 by	 UNICEF	 and	 run	 by	 the	 government	 of	 Mali.	 The	
intervention	relies	heavily	on	community	mobilization.	Experts	argue	that	adoption	
of	good	sanitation	practices	requires	focusing	on	the	whole	community	rather	than	
on	 individual	 behaviors	 (Kar	 and	 Chambers,	 2008).	 According	 to	 this	 view,	 the	
limiting	factor	for	ending	open	defecation	is	neither	informational,	nor	technical	or	
financial,	but	rather	lies	in	the	capacity	of	the	community	for	collective	action.		
	
Our	laboratory	experiments	in	the	field	help	focusing	on	specific	mechanisms	
through	which	the	Malian	community-led	sanitation	project	may	produce	its	impact	
and	test	behavioral	hypotheses	(Card,	DellaVigna	and	Malmendier,	2011).	We	ran	a	
series	of	Voluntary	Contribution	Mechanism	games	(Marwell	and	Ames,	1979)	with	
mild	 framing.	 We	 first	 measure	 cooperation	 when	 no	 communication	 is	allowed.	
We	then	investigate	the	role	of	communication:	does	unmonitored	open	discussion	
between	villagers	playing	the	game	lead	to	higher	cooperation?	Does	letting	a	game	
participant	 advise	 other	 villagers	 on	 the	 actions	 needed	 to	 reach	 the	 socially	
desirable	 outcome	 make	 a	 difference?	 How	 does	 this	 effect	 depend	 on	 the	
leadership	skills	of	the	person	designated	to	convey	the	message	to	the	rest	of	the	
group?	 One	 can	 expect	 that	 unobserved	 factors	 both	 explain	 leader	 quality	 and	
levels	 of	 cooperation	 within	 villages.	 For	 instance,	 previous	 mismanagement	 of	
public	resources	may	affect	 the	ability	of	villagers	 to	contribute	to	the	public	good	
and	to	have	good	leaders.	In	order	to	address	this	issue,	we	exogenously	manipulate	
the	quality	of	the	leader	who	is	chosen.	We	do	so	by	randomly	selecting	the	person	
in	charge	of	leading	the	discussion	in	each	village.		
	
The	contribution	of	 this	paper	 is	 twofold.	First,	our	study	 is	 embedded	 in	 a	
broader	 randomized	 controlled	 trial	 of	 this	 large-scale	 intervention	 to	 eliminate	
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open	defecation	in	rural	communities	in	Mali.1	The	literature	combining	randomized	
controlled	trials	(RCT)	to	evaluate	development	projects	and	lab	experiments	in	the	
field	 is	 relatively	 scarce.2	Our	 design	 included	 the	 lab	 experiments	 at	 the	 planning	
stage	of	 the	evaluation,	enabling	us	to	 test	 if	 there	 is	any	effect	of	 the	community-
based	 intervention	 on	 cooperation,	 as	 measured	 by	 the	 public	 good	 games.	 Our	
study	is	based	on	a	large	representative	sample	of	program	target	communities	for	
the	 region	 of	 Koulikoro	 in	 Mali.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 insights	 gained	 from	 our	
experimental	games	can	be	extrapolated	to	the	population	targeted	by	the	program	
in	this	region	and	similar	rural	areas.		
	
Secondly,	 our	 games	 allow	 us	 to	 test	 some	 of	 the	 links	 in	 the	 causal	 chain	
from	 the	 program	 to	 its	 impact.	 There	 are	 two	 reasons	 for	 that.	 One	 is	 that	
participants	are	drawn	from	the	pool	of	villagers	in	the	communities	targeted	by	the	
program.	 The	 second	 is	 that	 the	 experiments,	 although	 only	 mildly	 framed	 as	 a	
community	 activity	 with	 no	 mention	 to	 sanitation,	 are	designed	 to	 replicate	 some	
features	 of	 a	 community-based	 intervention.	 Community	 mobilization	 requires	
facilitating	 communication	 between	 village	 members	 and	 between	 community	
leaders	 and	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 group.	 	 Is	 communication	 an	 effective	 device	 through	
which	mobilization	may	foster	collective	action?	Does	informing	the	community	on	
how	to	reach	a	better	social	outcome	key?	Should	we	expect	the	effectiveness	of	the	
program	to	depend	on	the	quality	of	leadership	in	the	community?	Beyond	making	
the	exercise	policy-relevant,	having	the	experiments	played	on	the	field	rather	in	the	
lab	 is	 a	 necessary	 feature	 of	 our	 protocol.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 field	 provides	 the	
relevant	context	in	which	the	effect	of	leader	quality	on	cooperation	can	be	assessed.		
																																																								
1	We	collected	baseline	 data	in	March-June	2011	and	follow-up	data	in	March-June	2013	for	about	
5,000	households.	Using	random	assignment,	we	divided	the	village	sample	into	a	treatment	group,	
enrolled	 into	 the	 program	 in	 November	 2011,	 and	 a	 control	 group,	 whose	 participation	 to	 the	
program	is	postponed	until	the	end	of	June	2013.	The	RCT	timeline	is	presented	in	Appendix	Figure	
A1.	
2	There	are,	to	the	best	of	our	knowledge,	three	studies.	Jakiela	and	Miguel	(2014)	use	a	variant	of	the	
dictator	game	to	test	whether	a	merit-based	scholarship	program	in	Kenya	has	an	impact	on	respect	
for	earned	 property	rights.	 Barr	 et	 al.	 (2012)	 use	 public	 games	 to	 test	whether	 the	 introduction	of	
school	 monitoring	 committee	 in	 Uganda	 improved	 cooperation.	 Fearon	 et	 al.	 (2009)	 use	 similar	
games	 in	 communities	 affected	 by	 armed	 conflict	 in	 Liberia	 to	 test	 whether	 the	 introduction	 of	
community	development	committees	helps	raise	funds	to	a	collective	project.	
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We	 find,	 consistent	 with	 other	 findings	 in	 the	 lab,	 that	 communication	
between	villagers	improves	cooperation.	The	proportion	of	players	contributing	to	
the	public	game	increases	by	8	percentage	points	compared	to	a	base	of	71%.	When	
we	instruct	a	participant	to	tell	all	other	players	that	the	socially	efficient	outcome	
requires	them	to	all	contribute,	cooperation	also	 improves.	Compared	to	the	gains	
from	open	discussion,	improvement	is	higher	by	2	percentage	points.		
	
Interestingly,	 the	 leadership	 attributes	 of	 the	 person	 passing	 the	 advice	
matter.	Because	we	randomly	pick	the	person	who	acts	as	a	“leader”,	we	can	identify	
the	causal	effect	of	leadership	attributes.	First,	we	ask	players	to	rank	each	other	in	
terms	of	their	capacity	to	be	good	community	representatives,	good	conciliators	and	
with	respect	to	their	height.	We	find	that	relative	height	has	positive	and	significant	
effect	on	group	cooperation.		
	
Some	 leader	personal	attributes,	as	measured	 in	 the	household	survey,	also	
matter	 for	 cooperation.	 There	 is	 a	 statistically	 significant	 difference	 according	 to	
gender,	 as	 male	 leaders	 have	 a	 strong	 positive	 effect	 on	 group	 cooperation.	
Cooperation	increases	with	the	age	of	the	leader.	Using	an	index	of	social	capital,	we	
find	that	cooperation	is	greater	the	higher	social	capital	of	the	leader	is.	We	find	that	
literacy,	in	our	pool	of	players	where	literacy	rate	is	very	low	(15%),	has	a	negative	
and	significant	effect.		
	
Finally,	 cooperation,	 as	 measured	 by	 game	 outcomes,	 has	 improved	 as	 a	
result	of	 the	program.	We	find	a	positive	 and	 statistically	 significant	 impact	of	 the	
community-based	sanitation	intervention	on	game	contributions.		
	
In	 Section	 2,	 we	 present	 the	 setting.	 We	 then	 describe	 the	 experimental	
design	and	testable	hypotheses	in	Section	3.		Our	empirical	findings	are	presented	in	
section	4.	We	discuss	the	policy-relevance	of	our	findings	in	Section	5,	and	conclude	
in	Section	6.		
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2. RESEARCH	ENVIRONMENT	
	
Community-based	sanitation	
	
Our	games	are	embedded	in	a	broader	randomized	controlled	trial	of	a	large-
scale	intervention	to	eliminate	open	defecation	in	rural	communities	in	Mali.	Open	
defecation	 is	 a	 widespread	 practice	 in	 many	 rural	 and	 peri-urban	 areas	 in	
developing	countries.		Such	practice	is	believed	to	have	severe	health	consequences	
for	children	such	as	diarrhea	and	growth	retardation	(Spears,	2013).		
	
The	 programs	 aimed	 at	 eliminating	 open	 defecation	 have	 used	 various	
approaches	 ranging	 from	 high	 subsidies	 for	 sanitation	 hardware	 and	 sanitation	
marketing	to	community-based	approaches	that	aim	at	fostering	behavioral	change	
(and	 combinations	 of	 all	 of	 the	 above).	 One	 challenge	 faced	 by	 many	 of	 these	
interventions	is	usage	of	the	sanitation	facilities,	despite	improved	access.	
	
The	intervention	carried	out	in	Mali	is	called	Community	Led	Total	Sanitation	
(CLTS)	 and	 relies	 heavily	 on	 community	 mobilization	 as	 a	 way	 to	 foster	 collective	
action	 and	 achieve	 a	 cleaner	 environment.	 	 Typically,	 facilitators	 in	 charge	 of	 the	
program	gather	the	community	with	the	objective	of	triggering	the	adoption	of	good	
sanitation	 practices.	 During	 this	 initial	 gathering	 of	 the	 community,	 a	 number	 of	
activities	 are	 conducted	 to	 raise	 awareness	 on	 the	 risks	 associated	 with	 open	
defecation	and	help	develop	a	plan	to	build	 latrines.	Ultimately,	 the	objective	is	to	
end	open	defecation.	To	attain	this	objective,	everyone	in	the	community	has	to	have	
access	to	a	private	latrine	with	a	cover	that	is	equipped	with	a	hand	washing	station	
(bucket	 with	 water	 and	 ashes	 or	 soap).	 This	 initial	 gathering	 of	 the	 community	 is	
followed	by	a	period	of	 intensive	monitoring	to	encourage	progress	towards	goals	
agreed	upon	(building,	repairing	and	using	latrines).	Finally,	when	the	initial	plan	is	
met,	 the	community	 is	certified	as	Open	Defecation	Free	with	a	celebration	that	 is	
valued	by	community	members.			
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CLTS	 is	 an	 intervention	 aiming	 at	 solving	 a	 classic	 example	 of	 a	 collective	
action	problem,	whereas	each	member	of	 the	community	bears	the	private	cost	of	
contributing	 by	 building	 and	 using	 latrines	 and	 the	 benefits	 through	 better	 health	
outcomes	 depend	 on	 what	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 group	 do.	 The	 benefits	 of	 improved	
sanitation	are	higher	the	higher	the	proportion	of	people	in	the	community	adopting	
better	sanitation	practices.		
	
We	focus	on	the	community	mobilization	feature	of	CLTS	and	are	interested	
in	 looking	 specifically	 at	 the	 factors	 facilitating	 communication	 among	 village	
members,	and	between	community	leaders	and	the	rest	of	the	group.		
	
Koulikoro	village	sample		
	
The	 region	 of	 Koulikoro	 is	 divided	 in	 three	 agro-ecological	 zones,	 which	
reflect	three	distinct	economic	and	social	organizations.	The	Northern	zone	or	Sahel	
zone	is	very	arid,	with	a	long	dry	season	lasting	between	9	and	11	months.	The	main	
activity	 is	 transhumant	 nomadic	 stock	 rearing	 with	 subsistence	 agriculture.	 The	
middle	 zone,	 the	 Sudan	 zone,	 is	 semi-arid	 and	 sub-humid.	 There,	 agricultural	
activities	 are	 more	 intensive.	 Stock	 rearing	 is	 sedentary	 with	 seasonal	 migration,	
and	 is	 more	 integrated	 with	 crop	 production.	 The	 Southern	 zone	 is	 humid	 with	
production	oriented	towards	agriculture.	
	
The	 sample	 is	 designed	 to	 help	 assessing	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 sanitation	
intervention	in	Koulikoro.	The	sampling	frame	thus	includes	all	small	rural	villages	
with	low	latrine	coverage	and	no	sanitation	program	in	place.3	We	obtain	a	sampling	
frame	with	402	villages.	Our	main	source	of	information	for	sampling	is	the	Census	
data	from	1998	(Infrastructure du Recensement	1998).	We	use	updated	village	size	
by	applying	population	growth	rates	from	the	2009	Census.4	We	also	complemented	
																																																								
3	These	 are	 villages	with	30-70	 households	and	 with	 less	 than	60%	of	 household	having	 access	 to	
private	latrines.	
4	Unfortunately,	the	2009	Census	was	not	yet	released	at	the	date	we	built	the	sampling	frame.	
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these	data	with	a	list	of	villages	that	already	benefitted	of	the	intervention	that	we	
obtained	 from	 the	 Koulikoro	 Sanitation	 Office	 (Direction Régionale de 
l’Assainissement de Koulikoro).		
	
We	 opted	 for	 a	 systematic	 sampling	 method	 that	 allowed	 us	 to	 add	 a	
minimum	 spacing	 criterion	 between	 villages	 in	 order	 to	 limit	 contamination	 from	
neighboring	 communities. 5 	Indeed,	 physical	 contamination	 of	 fecal	 elements	
through	 air	 and	water	 from	 neighboring	 communities	may	 limit	 the	 benefits	 from	
the	 intervention	 and	 discourage	 the	 adoption	 of	 clean	 practices	 in	 the	 targeted	
villages.	 If	 the	program	is	brought	up	to	scale,	contamination	should	not	be	such	a	
concern.	 This,	 in	 turn,	 implies	 that	 the	 impact	 for	 our	 effectiveness	 trial	 can	 be	
considered	as	the	actual	impact	for	the	scaled-up	intervention.6	
	
We	draw	a	systematic	sample	based	on	the	following	steps:	
1. We	pick	a	village	(the	primary	sampling	unit)	at	random	from	the	sampling	
frame,	
2. We	 draw	 a	 circle	 of	 radius	 10km	 around	 the	 village	 and	 we	 pick	 another	
village	 at	 random	 from	 the	 sampling	 frame	 excluding	 the	 area	 around	 the	
previous	village,	
3. We	repeat	steps	(1)	and	(2)	until	we	get	121	villages	or	exhaust	the	sampling	
frame.		
We	then	conducted	a	census	of	all	households	in	 the	sample	villages.	Our	main	
survey	 module	 (the	 household	 questionnaire)	 gathered	 detailed	 information	 on	
households	 living	 in	 the	 sample	 villages	 with	 at	 least	 one	 child	 below	 age	 10.	 We	
also	collected	 information	at	the	village	level,	 and	at	the	household	and	 individual	
levels	for	all	household	members.		
	
	
																																																								
5	Any	two	villages	must	be	at	a	minimum	10	km	distance	from	each	other.	
6	In	contrast,	in	Miguel	and	Kremer	(2004),	positive	externalities	accounted	for	most	of	the	program	
impact,	so	missing	out	on	them	would	have	led	to	under-estimating	the	actual	program	benefit.	
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Game	participants	sample	
	
The	sampling	 frame	here	comprises	all	surveyed	households.	 In	each	of	 the	
village,	 every	 other	 household	 is	 randomly	 selected	 to	 send	 an	 adult	 household	
member	to	participate	to	the	games.	Clearly,	selection	within	household	is	not	likely	
to	 be	 random.	7	But	 this	 actually	 is	 similar	 to	 the	 way	 the	 community-driven	
sanitation	 program	 operates:	 they	 invite	 households	 to	 participate	 in	 community	
meetings,	and	it	is	the	household	who	chooses	who	to	send.	
	
An	 advantage	 of	 this	 sampling	 framework	 is	 that,	 once	 we	 apply	 sampling	
weights,	 our	 game	 results	 are	 representative	 of	 the	 intervention-targeted	
population	in	the	region	of	Koulikoro	and	similar	rural	areas.	
	
Sample	descriptive	statistics	
	
Descriptive	 statistics	 from	 the	 survey	 data	 is	 presented	 in	 Table	 1.	 The	
household	data	covers	121	villages,	about	4,500	households,	and	more	than	34,000	
individuals.	 There	 are	 37	 households	 per	 village	 on	 average,	 and	 7	 members	 per	
household.	 Literacy	 rates	 are	 low:	 only	 16%	 of	 the	 population	 over	 8	 years	 old	
knows	how	to	read	and	write.	The	population	is	young,	19	years	old	on	average.	The	
main	ethnic	group	 is	Bambara	(68%).	Most	of	the	 labor	 force	is	 in	agriculture	and	
livestock	rearing.		
	
Looking	 at	 the	 sample	 of	 game	 participants	 (Table	 2A),	 we	 conducted	 363	
sessions	 (3	 per	 village)	 with	 over	 3,000	 players.	 Sessions	 gathers	 23.4	 players	 on	
average.	 As	 expected,	 game	 participants	 are	 not	 representative	 of	 the	 village	
population.	Only	28%	of	them	were	male.	Average	age	is	35.	More	than	75%	of	them	
																																																								
7	Our	sampling	strategy	yields	a	representative	sample	of	households	from	which	game	participants	
were	selected.	But	the	last	step	in	the	selection	process	is	not	random.	Game	participants	had	to	be	at	
least	15	years	old.	We	ask	the	household	to	preferably	send	the	head	of	household	or	a	spouse.	If	
neither	of	them	were	available,	then	the	household	could	send	another	adult	household	member	to	
the	game.	
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are	 illiterate,	 and	 85%	 of	 them	 never	 went	 to	school.	Based	 on	 questions	 on	 their	
attitudes	towards	the	community	(belonging,	trust,	altruism,	reciprocity,	solidarity),	
we	constructed	an	index	of	social	capital.	The	average	value	of	this	index	is	2.89	in	
the	 game	 participants	 sample,	 compared	 to	 2.83	 in	 the	 household	 survey	 sample.	
The	difference	is	not	surprising:	game	participants	are	older	on	average,	and	social	
capital	increases	with	age.		
	
3. EXPERIMENTAL	DESIGN	AND	HYPOTHESES	
	
Treatments	
	
Our	research	design	consisted	in	three	within-subject	treatments	of	a	public	
good	 game.	 The	 base	 treatment	 is	 a	 standard	 public	 good	 game	 without	
communication.	 In	 the	 two	 other	 treatments,	 we	 allow	 some	 form	 of	
communication.	 In	 the	 unmonitored	 open	discussion	treatment,	 participants	 are	
allowed	 to	 talk	 to	 each	 other	 freely	 for	 five	 minutes.	 In	 the	 leader	 treatment,	 a	
randomly	 selected	 participant	 is	 designated	 as	 a	 leader:	 she	 is	 told	 what	 actions	
everyone	should	take	in	order	to	maximize	the	group	payoff	and	she	is	instructed	to	
convey	this	message	to	the	rest	of	the	group.		
	
The	three	treatments	have	the	same	monetary	payoff	structure	(Marwell	and	
Ames,	 1979).	 There	 are	 two	 goods,	 a	 private	 one	 and	 a	 public	 one,	 and	 m	
participants.	 The	 experimenter	 provides	 each	 participant	  = {1,… , }	with	 one	
token.	 Choice	 set	 includes	 two	 options	   = {0,1},	 to	 keep	 the	 token	 (   = 0)	 or	 to	
invest	it	in	the	public	good	(   = 1).8	If	the	token	is	kept,	it	yields	a	payoff	p	to	player	
i	only.	 If	 the	 token	 is	 invested	 in	 the	group	project,	 it	yields	a	payoff	of	a	 to	 every	
player	 j	 including	 i.	 In	 sum,	 the	 payoffs	 function	 is	 given	 by:	   =  (1 −   ) +
 (∑   
 
    ).	 Thus,	 the	 public	 good	 produced	 depends	 linearly	 on	 each	 individual’s	
contribution.	All	decisions	are	made	simultaneously	and	privately,	without	knowing	
																																																								
8	Knowing	 the	 challenges	 regarding	 literacy	 and	 simplicity,	 we	 have	 used	 a	 simple	 dichotomous	
cooperation	decision-making	setting	(Cardenas	&	Jaramillo,	2007)	that	requires	no	use	of	pencil.	
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what	others	will	do.	Assuming	participants	only	care	about	their	monetary	payoffs,	
and	as	long	as	  < 	 ,	there	will	be	no	incentives	to	contribute	to	the	group	account,	
i.e.,	∀  = {1, … , }:   
     = 0	,	resulting	in	a	socially	inefficient	outcome.	In	this	case,	
each	 player	 obtains	   =  ,	 and	 the	 group	outcome	 is	∑   =   .	 However	 if	 every	
player	 contributes	 to	 the	 group	 account,	 i.e.	 ,	∀  = {1, … , }:   
   .   .
= 1,	 then	 the	
social	 optimum	 is	 obtained.	 In	 this	 case,	 the	 earnings	 for	 each	 player	 are	   =   ,	
and	the	group	outcome	is	∑   =  
   >   .	
	
In	our	setting,	if	the	player	invests	the	token	in	the	public	account,	his	token	
and	 those	 of	 others	 in	 the	 group	 account	 yield	 a	 return	 of	  = 1	for	 every	 other	
participant	(including	 those	who	kept	 their	 tokens).	A	player	who	keeps	his	 token	
earns	an	additional	  = 10.		
	
Procedures	
	
We	recruited	on	average	20	to	25	players	for	each	session.	Each	participant	
played	in	three	sessions.	Because	we	expect	that	the	order	of	the	rounds	may	matter	
for	contributions,	we	randomly	manipulate	the	order	of	open	discussion	and	leader	
treatments.	All	individual	decisions	are	kept	private	and	confidential.	We	explained	
the	 base	 game	 extensively	 to	 make	 sure	 that	 players	 understood	 it.9	At	 the	 end	 of	
the	 experiment,	 group	 actions	 are	 revealed	 publicly	 for	 each	 treatment,	 so	 that	
players	 know	 how	 many	 points	 they	 earned	 depending	 on	 their	 own	 action.	
Earnings	 are	revealed	 to	 each	 participant	 in	 a	 private	 way	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 three	
sessions	 when	 they	 collect	 their	 rewards.	 After	 participants	 make	 their	 decisions,	
but	 before	 they	 learn	 about	 their	 earnings,	 they	 are	 requested	 to	 privately	 report	
their	 predictions	 on	 the	 group’s	 actions.	 In	 Appendix	 Figure	 A2,	 we	 show	 the	
timeline	for	the	games.		
	
																																																								
9	Experimenters	 worked	 in	 teams	 of	 five,	 each	 individual	 with	 specific	 tasks	 to	 perform	 (see	
Appendix	Table	A1).	Given	the	number	of	experimental	sessions,	instructions	to	experimenters	were	
made	as	simple	as	possible.	Experimenters	were	trained	on	this	protocol	for	8	days.		
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In	 order	 to	 incentivize	 participants,	 players	 earn	 points	 that	 are	 then	
translated	 into	 rewards.	 In	 order	 not	 to	 interfere	 with	 the	 sanitation	 intervention	
that	 took	 place	 in	 some	 of	 these	 villages,10	we	 converted	 the	 points	 into	 small	
valuable	 household	 items	 unrelated	 to	 sanitation	 (e.g.	 batteries,	 pens,	 paper	 pads,	
lighters)	instead	of	providing	monetary	payments.	The	complete	game	protocol	(in	
French)	is	available	upon	request.		
	
Framing	of	the	games	
	
There	 is	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 possibilities	 for	 presenting	 the	 games	 to	
participants,	 from	 an	 abstract	 game	 with	 no	 reference	 to	 a	 particular	 cooperation	
problem	 to	 a	 heavily	 framed	 situation	 that	 can	 hint	 players	 to	 the	 study’s	 larger	
purpose,	 i.e.,	 studying	 their	 behavior	 in	 order	 to	 understand	 how	 the	 community-
driven	 sanitation	 program	 may	 affect	 them.	 Here,	 we	 chose	 a	 weak	 framing	 that	
serves	to	have	participants’	mindset	on	collective	action.	This	mild	framing	is	meant	
for	villagers	to	act	according	to	past	experience	and	underlying	social	norms.	
	
Our	 public	 good	 games	 are	 framed	 as	 foroba	 games,	11	i.e.,	 games	 of	 the	
common	pot.	The	name	given	to	the	token	is	niyoro,	also	a	Bambara	term	for	a	token	
used	 in	 common	 transactions.	 Use	 of	 foroba	 and	 niyoro	 as	 labels	 should	 remind	
them	of	a	familiar	setting	in	which	people	usually	contribute	to	a	common	pot	and	
get	 a	 valuable	 amount	 in	 return.	 We	 decided	 against	 framing	 the	 public	 good	
according	to	the	sanitation	 issue	that	 is	central	 to	 the	research	project	 in	order	 to	
not	 contaminate	 our	 results	 with	 specific	 issues	 with	 the	 intervention	 that	 took	
place.	Yet,	we	maintain	a	weak	framing	to	collective	action.	
	
																																																								
10	UNICEF	 considered	 that	 the	 community-based	 approach	 to	 sanitation	 would	 have	 been	
compromised	 if	 we	 were	 to	 distribute	 monetary	 payments	 to	 some	 individuals	 in	 intervention	
villages.	 In	 order	 to	 keep	 the	 support	 of	 UNICEF	 to	 the	 larger	 evaluation	 project,	 we	 agreed	 on	
incentivizing	the	games	with	in-kind	payments.		
11	In	Bambara,	the	lingua	franca	most	widely	used	in	Mali,	foroba	refers	to	a	cooking	pot	and	also	to	a	
gathering	of	neighbors	for	a	community	cook	out	where	every	member	brings	an	input	and	everyone	
benefits	from	the	meal	produced.	
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Ranking	games	
	
At	 the	 end	 of	 the	 three	 rounds,	 we	 conduct	 “Rankings	 games”,	 with	 the	
objective	 of	 identifying	 leaders	 and	 influential	 individuals	 among	 players.	 	 The	
games	consist	of	a	series	of	rankings,	where	participants	have	to	rank	themselves	in	
a	 circle	 according	 to	 some	 specific	 criteria.	 First,	 the	 participants	 have	 to	 rank	
themselves	 according	 to	 height,	 from	 taller	 to	 shorter.12	The	 last	 three	 rankings	
were	 framed	 after	 extensive	 focus	 groups	 with	 community	 specialists.	 For	 the	
second	 ranking	 game,	 villagers	 have	 to	 rank	 each	 other	 according	 to	 who	 would	
better	 represent	 them	 as	 dancers	 in	 a	 hypothetical	 regional	 competition.13	For	 the	
third	 ranking	 game,	 participants	 have	 to	 rank	 according	 to	 who	 would	 represent	
better	 the	 community	 in	 the	 hypothetical	 situation	 where	 an	 official	 in	 Bamako	
made	a	decision	which	 is	considered	detrimental	 for	 the	community	and	someone	
needs	 to	 convince	 him	 not	 to	 execute	 it.	 In	 the	 fourth	 and	 last	 ranking	 game,	
participants	 rank	 according	 to	 whom	 would	 best	 help	 them	 to	 resolve	 a	 conflict	
between	community	members.		
	
Hypotheses	
	
Our	 first	 hypothesis	 is	 based	 on	 previous	 experimental	 research	 on	
communication	 (Isaac	 and	 Walker	 (1988),	 Cason	 and	 Khan	 (1999),	 Bochet	 and	
Putterman	(2009),	among	others).		
	
Hypothesis	 1	 (open	 discussion):	 Unmonitored	 open	 communication	 between	
villagers	improves	cooperation.		
	
Hypotheses	 2	 and	 3	 pertain	 to	 the	 role	 of	 leadership	 in	 communication.	
Assuming	 that	 leaders	 are	 in	 favor	 of	 collective	 action,	 we	 first	 test	 whether,	
																																																								
12	Height	is	a	sign	of	social	status.	Taller	individuals	may	have	benefitted	from	early-life	investment	
in	nutrition	and	may	come	from	wealthier	households.	Height	also	correlates	with	cognitive	ability	
(Lindquist,	2012).		
13	Dancing	is	a	popular	activity	in	Mali,	which	imparts	status	to	talented	individuals.		
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regardless	of	 quality	 of	 leadership,	 simply	 having	 one	 community	 member	 inform	
others	 on	 how	 to	 reach	 the	 socially	 desirable	 outcome	 may	 affect	 cooperation.	
Secondly,	 leaders	 vary	 in	 term	 of	 their	 skills.	 Thus,	 a	 natural	 hypothesis	 to	 test	 is	
that	the	extent	to	which	cooperation	may	be	improved	depends	on	the	quality	of	the	
leader.		
	
Hypothesis	 2	 (leader	 treatment	 I):	 controlled	 communication	 (one	 randomly	
chosen	 person	 is	 instructed	 to	 tell	 all	 other	 players	 that	 the	 group	 as	 a	 whole	 can	
attain	the	highest	payoff	if	everyone	contributes)	improves	cooperation.		
	
Hypothesis	 3	 (leader	 treatment	 II):	 Controlled	 communication	 leads	 to	 greater	
contributions	the	higher	the	quality	of	the	leader.		
	
There	are	previous	experimental	results	on	model	of	 leadership-by-example	
proposed	by	Hamerlin	(1998).	 In	this	model,	a	 leader	 is	 informed	about	 the	social	
return	from	cooperation	and	he	passes	this	message	to	uninformed	followers.	In	our	
experiment,	 as	 in	 other	 previous	 experiments,	 a	 leader	 is	 picked	 at	 random.	 	 The	
main	difference	is	that,	in	previous	work,	the	contribution	of	the	leader	is	revealed	
to	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 group	 before	 they	 make	 their	 decisions,	 while	 in	 our	 field	
experiment,	 it	 is	 not	 (see,	 for	 instance,	 Moxnes and van der Heijden 2003, Potters 
2007, Arbak	 and	 Villeval	 2013).	 Instead,	 participants,	 who	 know	 each	 other,	 use	
what	 they	 know	 about	 the	 person	 designated	 as	 a	 leader,	 as	 well	 as	 the	
informational	content	of	the	message	he	is	instructed	to	convey,	when	making	their	
decision	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 public	 good.	 We	 thus	 test	 whether	 the	 observable	
attributes	of	imposed	leaders	may	influence	group	cooperation.	
Finally,	 our	 last	 hypothesis	 is	 related	 to	 the	 community-based	 intervention	
we	evaluate.	Community-based	intervention,	by	fostering	a	participatory	approach,	
may	strengthen	the	capacity	of	the	community	for	collective	action.		
	
Hypothesis	4	(RCT):	Cooperation	is	higher	as	a	result	of	the	program.	
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Testing	the	last	two	hypotheses	provide	a	rationale	for	conducting	the	experiments	
in	the	field	rather	than	in	a	lab.		
	
4. RESULTS	
	
In	the	base	treatment,	71%	of	 the	participants	contribute	to	 the	 foroba (Figure	
1).	 Cooperation	 level	 is	 quite	 high	 in	 these	 villages	 compared	 to	 what	 is	 usually	
found	from	lab	experiments	with	university	students,	but	similar	to	those	obtained	
from	lab	experiments	in	the	field	in	developing	countries	(Cardenas	and	Carpenter	
2008).14		
	
Contributions	 are	 higher	 in	 the	 discussion	 and	 leader	 treatment,	 respectively	
79%	 and	 81%	 (Figures	 1	 and	 2).	 The	 differences	 between	 treatments	 are	 all	
statistically	 significant	 (Table	 11).	 So	 we	 cannot	 reject	 hypothesis	 1	 (open	
discussion)	and	hypothesis	2	(leader	treatment	I).	We	interpret	these	differences	
as	causal	impacts	of	the	treatments.	Although	we	did	not	reveal	contributions	until	
the	end	of	the	three	treatments,	one	may	be	still	concerned	that	in	a	within-subject	
design	 treatment	 effects	 may	 be	 confounded.15	Because	 we	 randomly	 manipulate	
the	order	of	 the	communication	and	leader	round,	timing	effects	are	averaged	out.	
Hence,	we	interpret	the	8-percentage	point	(p.p.)	increase	in	cooperation	as	a	result	
of	 communication	 between	 village	 participants.	 In	 addition,	 villagers	 who	 had	
already	 participated	 in	 the	games	 at	 baseline	 are	 not	 contributing	 differently	 than	
those	who	are	playing	for	the	first	time.16		
	
																																																								
14	In	Zimbabwe,	Barr	(2001)	find	that	participants	to	a	VCM	contribute	between	48	and	52%	of	
endowment.	In	Vietnam	and	Thailand,	it	is	respectively	between	72	and	76%	and	between	61	and	
73%	(Carpenter	et	al.	2004).	In	Kenya,	Ensminger	(2000)	find	that	people	contribute	58%	of	their	
endowment.	In	Peru,	Karlan	(2005)	finds	that	81%	of	participants	contribute	in	a	threshold	public	
game.	Figures	for	the	U.S.	are	lower	(between	30-40%).		
15	Strategic	effects	may	happen	when	contributions	are	revealed	between	rounds.	In	our	setting,	
participants	learn	about	their	payoffs	only	at	the	end	of	the	three	sessions.	In	repeated	public	games	
for	which	outcomes	are	revealed	between	rounds,	cooperation	tends	to	decrease	through	time.	
16	This	is	obtained	from	combining	baseline	(2011)	and	follow-up	(2013)	data	on	games.	Results	
available	upon	request.					
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The	 difference	 between	 leader	 treatment	 and	 base	 treatment	 is	 an	 effect	 from	
passing	information	on	how	to	reach	the	socially	desirable	outcome.	Since	the	leader	
is	 randomly	 picked,	 average	 contributions	 in	 the	 leader	 treatment	 corresponds	 to	
average	 contributions	 under	 average	 leader	 quality.	 So	 it	 is	 the	 passing	 of	
information	through	an	average	community	member	that	increases	cooperation	by	
10	p.p.,	an	statistically	significant	effect	(Table	11).	
	
	Interestingly,	 beliefs	 follow	 the	 same	 patterns	 as	 contributions	 (Figures	 3	 and	
4).	 In	 the	 base	 treatment,	 48%	 of	 participants	 believe	 that	 everyone	 would	
contribute	(average	is	69%).	In	the	communication	(leader)	treatment,	57%	(61%)	
believe	 that	 everyone	 would	 contribute.	 Beliefs	 on	 contributions	 by	 others	 are	
higher	 in	 the	 communication	 and	 leader	 treatment,	 a	 statistically	 significant	
difference	 (Table	 11).	 Again,	 we	 interpret	 these	 changes	 as	 causal	 effects	 of	 the	
treatments	 (open	 discussion	 and	 leader	 treatment)	 on	 beliefs.	 Taken	 together,	 the	
evidence	 on	 the	 effects	 of	 communication	 on	 contributions	 discussed	 earlier	 and	
these	 findings	 are	 consistent	 with	 communication	 affecting	 contributions	 through	
beliefs.	 	However,	the	design	of	our	experiments	does	allow	us	to	be	conclusive	on	
this	point.	
	
In	 Table	 3-8,	 we	 present	 estimates	 of	 the	 causal	 effects	of	 leader	 attributes	 on	
players’	contribution	 levels	and	beliefs	 in	 the	 leader	round.	Overall,	we	find	 that	a	
number	 of	 leader	 characteristics	 influence	 group	 contributions,	 so	 hypothesis	 3	
(leader	treatment	II)	is	not	rejected.	Tables	3-4	pertain	to	the	leader	attributes	as	
measured	in	the	ranking	games.	Relatively	taller	 leaders	elicit	higher	contributions	
than	shorter	ones	(Table	3).	Compared	to	a	leader	ranked	last	(based	on	a	23	rank	
ladder)17,	a	leader	ranked	first	would	lead	2.16	people	to	switch	to	cooperation	on	
average.18	This	effect	 is	not	significant	 in	 the	base	specification	without	covariates,	
																																																								
17	There	are	on	average	23	players	in	each	village.	
18	A	one-point	increase	in	rank	is	associated	with	a	0.41	p.p.	point	increase	in	contributions.	With	
linear	effects,	a	23	point	difference	in	ranking	is	associated	with	a	9.43	p.p.	increase	in	the	fraction	of	
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and	marginally	significant	at	10%	in	a	specification	with	covariates.	No	other	leader	
attribute	from	the	ranking	games	significantly	affects	players’	cooperation.	
	
Leader’s	relative	height	also	matters	for	beliefs	(Table	4)	and	the	magnitude	of	
the	effect	is	similar	to	the	one	on	cooperation	decisions.	This	finding	suggests	that	a	
good	 leader	 (where	 quality	 is	 proxied	 by	 height)	 shapes	 beliefs,	 resulting	 in	
increased	 cooperation.	 Good	 leaders	 make	 other	 participants	 believe	 that	 many	
more	people	contribute	than	what	they	thought,	and	this	change	in	beliefs	may	then	
translate	into	actions	for	some	of	them.				
	 	 	
In	 Tables	 5	 and	 6,	 we	 show	 that	 cooperation	 also	 depends	 on	 some	 of	 the	
personal	 characteristics	 of	 the	 leader,	 as	 measured	 in	 the	 household	 survey.	 This	
includes	 age,	 gender,	 literacy,	 social	 capital	 and	 relationship	 to	 the	 head	 of	
household.	We	find	that	most	of	these	attributes	matter	(column	1).19	The	effect	of	
age	 is	 positive,	 statistically	 significant	 and	 large:	 each	 additional	 year	 of	 age	 is	
associated	with	a	0.21	p.p.	increase	in	average	contribution.	Literacy	has	a	negative	
and	statistically	significant	effect:	a	literate	leader	reduces	contributions	by	7.2	p.p..	
This	 surprising	 effect	 may	 be	 explained	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 85%	 of	 the	 villagers	 are	
illiterate.	 We	 find	 that,	 compared	 to	 female	 leaders,	 male	 leaders	 significantly	
increase	contributions	by	8.55	p.p..	Cooperation	also	significantly	increases	with	the	
level	 of	 social	 capital	 of	 the	 leader.	 However,	 we	 find	 not	 statistically	 significant	
effect	 pf	 leader’s	age,	 gender,	 literacy,	 social	 capital	 or	 status	 in	 the	 household	 on	
players’	beliefs	(Table	6).		
	
	 Finally,	 we	 show	 how	 the	 leader’s	 contribution	 decision	 and	 belief	 at	 base	
game	 influences	 other	 players’	 actions	 in	 the	 leader	 round	 (Table	 7).	20	Group	
																																																																																																																																																																					
players	who	contribute.	For	a	group	of	23	players,	that	is	equivalent	to	9.43∗
  
   
= 2.16	additional	
contributors.		
19	Only	leader	gender	and	social	capital	are	significant	in	a	specification	with	covariates	(column	2).		
20	In	contrast	to	the	rest	of	the	experimental	literature,	we	do	not	reveal	leader’s	action	or	beliefs	to	
the	rest	of	the	group	before	they	make	their	decision	(or	at	any	other	time).	So,	if	villagers’	actions	
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contributions	are	higher	 if	 the	 leader	contributed	 in	 the	 base	round	than	 if	he	did	
not.	 Contributions	 also	 depend	 positively	 on	 leader’s	 beliefs	 in	 base	 round.	 In	
addition,	 group	 beliefs	 are	 positively	 affected	 by	 leader’s	 action	 and	 beliefs	 (Table	
8).	This	again	points	to	updating	in	beliefs	as	a	possible	mechanism	through	which	
communication	by	a	leader	affects	overall	cooperation.				
	
We	find	a	positive	and	statistically	significant	impact	of	the	community-based	
sanitation	 intervention	 on	 cooperation,	 as	 measured	 in	 the	 games	 (Table	 9).	 This	
implies	 that	 we	 cannot	 reject	 hypothesis	 4	 (RCT).	 We	 find	 a	 4.5-5	 p.p.	 gain	 in	
cooperation	 that	 can	 be	 attributable	 to	 the	 intervention.	 In	 comparison,	 the	 gains	
from	 open	 discussion	 and	 leader	 treatments	 are	 respectively	 8	 and	 10	 p.p..	 This	
suggests	that	 fostering	open	discussion	and	 leadership	position	 is	a	 key	 feature	 in	
the	community-based	approach.		
	
5. POLICY-RELEVANCE		
	
Extrapolating	 lab	 experiment	 results	 beyond	 a	 specific	 institutional	
environment	 is	 complicated.	 However,	 our	 results	 suggest	 two	 relevant	
implications.	 First,	 leadership	 and	 communication	matter	 for	 addressing	 collective	
actions	 problems.	 Furthermore,	 our	 large	 sample	 is	 representative	 of	 rural	
Koulikoro.	In	this	sense,	the	sample	of	players	for	our	games	is	representative	of	the	
population	 targeted	 by	 the	 community-based	 sanitation	 intervention	 through	
community	mobilization	activities.	Second,	our	mild	frame	allows	us	to	interpret	our	
results	 for	 a	 wider	 set	 of	 community-based	 interventions,	 whenever	 a	 community	
needs	a	high	level	of	mobilization	in	order	to	achieve	the	provision	of	public	goods.		
	
Similarly	 to	 Cason	 and	 Kahn	 (1999),	 our	 results	 support	 the	 idea	 that	
community-based	 development	 programs	 that	 rely	 on	 collective	 action	 should	
stress	 the	 role	 of	 communication,	 either	 among	 community	members	 or	 mediated	
																																																																																																																																																																					
are	found	to	depend	on	their	 leader’s	action,	 it	 is	because	they	know	the	 person	and	may	consider	
her	as	trustworthy.		
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by	 a	 leader	 as	 a	 way	 to	 achieve	 their	 goals.	 In	 the	 realm	 of	 community-based	
sanitation,	this	view	is	already	put	into	action,	as	found	in	the	guidelines	offered	to	
field	 practitioners	 that	 stress	 the	 role	 of	 leadership	 and	 communication	 as	 key	
factors	in	the	success	of	CLTS	programs	(Kar	and	Chambers	2008).		
	
Finally,	 our	 results	 suggest	 that	 games	 in	 the	 field,	 with	 the	 required	
representativeness,	can	become	a	useful	 tool	 for	 testing	underlying	 theories	about	
what	may	be	working	(or	not)	in	community-based	interventions.		
	
	
6.	SUMMARY	OF	FINDINGS	AND	CONCLUSION	
	
	
In	rural	communities	of	Mali,	we	find	evidence	of	high	levels	of	cooperation	
as	measured	by	a	standard	public	good	game.	Expectations	about	others	behavior	is	
also	 high.	 Communication	 between	 players	 both	 increases	 contributions	 to	 the	
public	good	and	expectations.	This	 finding	 is	consistent	with	 lab	experiments.	The	
proportion	of	contributors	to	the	public	good	increases	8	p.p.,	compared	to	a	base	of	
71%,	 which	 is	 already	 high	 compared	 to	 lab	 experiments,	 but	 in	 line	 with	 other	
findings	 in	 developing	 countries.	 Passing	 of	 information	 through	 a	 random	
community	member	on	how	to	achieve	the	socially	desirable	outcome	also	improves	
cooperation:	 contributions	 increase	 by	 2p.p.	 compared	 to	 the	 open	 unstructured	
discussion.	 Since	 the	 leader	 is	 randomly	 chosen,	 this	 is	 the	 gain	 from	 “passing	
advice”	for	a	leader	of	average	quality.		We	also	find	that	some	characteristics	of	the	
leader	matter	for	increasing	group	contributions	and	expectations	about	how	others	
behave.	A	good	leader	is	someone	who	is	relatively	taller	than	other	participants.	In	
the	setting	of	rural	Mali,	height	 is	an	 indicator	of	good	health	and	higher	cognitive	
skills.	Other	attributes	such	as	gender,	age,	literacy	and	social	capital	also	influence	
cooperation.	
	
In	our	games,	contrary	to	other	examples	in	the	lab,	actions	and	beliefs	of	the	
leader	 are	 not	 revealed	 after	 she	 addresses	 the	 participants,	 or	 at	 any	other	 time.	
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However,	we	find	that	leader’s	action	and	beliefs	in	the	base	round	have	a	positive	
effect	on	players’	contributions.	This	suggests	that	leaders	who	cooperate	or	believe	
the	rest	of	the	group	cooperates	are	better	at	conveying	a	message	about	collective	
action.		
	
The	 experiments	 are	 embedded	 in	 a	 larger	 randomized	 controlled	 trial	
designed	to	evaluate	the	impact	of	a	community-based	sanitation	intervention.	This	
has	two	 implications.	First,	our	results	are	relevant	 for	a	 large	population.	We	find	
that	the	program	help	strengthen	the	capacity	for	collective	action,	and	these	effects	
are	statistically	 significant.	 Second,	 given	 the	 mild	 frame	 used	 in	 the	 experiments,	
our	 results	 may	 be	 relevant	 for	 a	 wider	 set	 of	 community-based	 interventions,	
whenever	a	community	needs	a	high	level	of	mobilization	 in	order	to	 facilitate	 the	
provision	of	public	goods.		
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Table	1A:	Descriptive	statistics	
	 	 	Variable	 N	 Mean	 SD	
Average	number	of	households	by	village	 121	 37.455	 13.341	
Average	number	of	member	per	household	 4532	 7.603	 3.891	
Literacy	(age	>=8)	 17412	 0.168	 0.374	
Ethnic	group	Bambara	 20230	 0.686	 0.464	
Average	age	 34406	 18.788	 17.515	
Male	 34435	 0.490	 0.500	
	
	
Table	1B:	Main	economic	Activity	
	 	Variable	 N	 %	
Agricultural	and	horticultural	crops	 4,504	 28.16	
Livestock	and	poultry	 738	 4.61	
Fishing	 25	 0.16	
Forestry	 458	 2.86	
Trade	 644	 4.03	
Processing	industry	 75	 0.47	
Communal	(medical	practice,	education,	etc.).	 82	 0.51	
Transport	 22	 0.14	
Mining	and	extraction	 147	 0.92	
Construction	 1,199	 7.5	
Unemployed	family	member	 4,730	 29.58	
Other	 3,369	 21.07	
	
Table 2A: Participants characteristics 
Variable	 N	 Mean	 SD	
Literacy	(1=read	and	write)	 2860	 0.151	 0.358	
Age	 2967	 35.789	 12.230	
Sex	(1=Male)	 2985	 0.276	 0.447	
Mother	language	(Bambara=1)	 2997	 0.735	 0.441	
Social	Capital	 2983	 2.880	 0.725	
Number	of	players	 2997	 23.340	 2.804	
	
Table 2B: Round contributions and beliefs averages 
Variable	 N	 Mean	 Std.	Dev.	
Contributions	at	base	round	 2798	 0.713	 0.453	
Contributions	in	discussion	round	 2799	 0.791	 0.407	
Contributions	in	leader	round	 2798	 0.806	 0.396	
Beliefs	in	base	round	 2778	 0.691	 0.368	
Beliefs	in	discussion	round	 2781	 0.747	 0.354	
Beliefs	in	leader	round	 2785	 0.766	 0.351	
	
	
	 	
	 24
Table	3	:	Effect	of	leader’s	characteristics	(Ranking	indices)	on	contributions	in	the	leader	round	
	
Dependent	Variable		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	
Contribution	in	the	leader	round	
	 	 			 		 		 		
Leader	representativeness	 -0.0001	 -0.0006	 -0.0006	
	
[0.0026]	 [0.0025]	 [0.0027]	
Leader	conciliator	 -0.0003	 0.0009	 0.0015	
	
[0.0026]	 [0.0026]	 [0.0027]	
Leader	height	 -0.0034	 -0.0041*	 -0.0039	
	
[0.0027]	 [0.0024]	 [0.0026]	
Leader	dance	 -0.0001	 -0.0006	 -0.0002	
	
[0.0024]	 [0.0024]	 [0.0025]	
#	of	players	 0.0041	 0.0052	 0.0036	
	
[0.0056]	 [0.0052]	 [0.0058]	
%	Bambara	speakers	by	village	
	 	
0.0076	
	 	 	
[0.0590]	
%	Crime	by	village	
	 	
0.2466*	
	 	 	
[0.1473]	
%	Organizations,	participation	by	village	
	 	
-0.0771	
	 	 	
[0.0478]	
%	Social	capital	by	village	
	
0.1551**	 0.1622**	
	 	
[0.0594]	 [0.0678]	
Cercle	dummies	
	 	
Yes	
Constant	 0.7525***	 0.2871	 0.3177	
	
[0.1196]	 [0.2128]	 [0.2652]	
	 	 	 	Observations	 2,797	 2,797	 2,797	
R-squared	 0.0043	 0.0159	 0.0250	
Clustered	robust	standard	errors	in	brackets,	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1.	
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Table	4:	Effect	of	leader’s	characteristics	(Ranking	indices)	on	beliefs	in	the	leader	round	
Dependent	Variable		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	
Beliefs	in	the	leader	round	
	 	 	 	 			 		 		 		 		 		
Leader	representativeness	 0.0003	 -0.0001	 -0.0003	 -0.0001	 -0.0004	
	
[0.0031]	 [0.0029]	 [0.0028]	 [0.0029]	 [0.0028]	
Leader	conciliator	 0.0002	 0.0011	 -0.0001	 0.0011	 -0.0003	
	
[0.0024]	 [0.0025]	 [0.0025]	 [0.0025]	 [0.0025]	
Leader	height	 -0.0052**	 -0.0058**	 -0.0048*	 -0.0089***	 -0.0077**	
	
[0.0026]	 [0.0025]	 [0.0025]	 [0.0029]	 [0.0030]	
Leader	dance	 -0.0007	 -0.0011	 -0.0014	 -0.0011	 -0.0014	
	
[0.0021]	 [0.0020]	 [0.0021]	 [0.0020]	 [0.0021]	
Height	ranking	
	 	 	
-0.0038**	 -0.0036**	
	 	 	 	
[0.0015]	 [0.0014]	
Interaction	height	ranking*leader	height	
	 	 	
0.0002**	 0.0002**	
	 	 	 	
[0.0001]	 [0.0001]	
#	of	players	 0.0007	 0.0016	 -0.0011	 0.0021	 -0.0005	
	
[0.0059]	 [0.0058]	 [0.0064]	 [0.0059]	 [0.0065]	
%	Bambara	speakers	by	village	
	 	
-0.0299	
	
-0.0322	
	 	 	
[0.0507]	
	
[0.0504]	
%	Crime	by	village	
	 	
-0.1206	
	
-0.1257	
	 	 	
[0.1613]	
	
[0.1609]	
%	Organizations,	participation	by	village	
	 	
-0.0162	
	
-0.0192	
	 	 	
[0.0507]	
	
[0.0508]	
%	Social	capital	by	village	
	
0.1313**	 0.1506**	 0.1269**	 0.1460**	
	 	
[0.0628]	 [0.0613]	 [0.0627]	 [0.0610]	
Cercle	dummies	
	 	
Yes	
	
Yes	
Constant	 0.8114***	 0.4178*	 0.4847*	 0.4669*	 0.5381**	
	
[0.1297]	 [0.2494]	 [0.2692]	 [0.2488]	 [0.2683]	
	 	 	 	 	 	Observations	 2,784	 2,784	 2,784	 2,765	 2,765	
R-squared	 0.0114	 0.0220	 0.0366	 0.0237	 0.0390	
Clustered	standard	errors	in	brackets,	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1.	
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Table	5:	Effect	of	leader’s	characteristics	on	contributions	in	the	leader	round	
	
Dependent	Variable		 (1)	 (2)	
Contribution	in	the	leader	round	
	 			 		 		
Leader	male	 0.0855**	 0.0777**	
	
[0.0348]	 [0.0351]	
Leader	age	 0.0021*	 0.0018	
	
[0.0013]	 [0.0013]	
Leader	literacy	 -0.0720*	 -0.0632	
	
[0.0391]	 [0.0416]	
Leader	social	capital	 0.0441**	 0.0421*	
	
[0.0222]	 [0.0217]	
Leader	household	head	 -0.0780	 -0.0763	
	
[0.0485]	 [0.0496]	
%	Bambara	speakers	by	village	
	
-0.0473	
	 	
[0.0662]	
%	Crime	by	village	
	
0.1488	
	 	
[0.1359]	
%	Organizations,	participation	by	village	
	
-0.0348	
	 	
[0.0557]	
Cercle	dummies	
	
Yes	
Constant	 0.6070***	 0.6697***	
	
[0.0891]	 [0.1118]	
	 	 	Observations	 2,797	 2,797	
R-squared	 0.0187	 0.0232	
Clustered	robust	standard	errors	in	brackets,	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1.	
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Table	6:	Effect	of	leader’s	characteristics	on	beliefs	in	the	leader	round	
	
Dependent	Variable		 (1)	 (2)	
Beliefs	in	the	leader	round	
	 			
	 	Leader	male	 0.0140	 0.0151	
	
[0.0470]	 [0.0470]	
Leader	age	 0.0017	 0.0018	
	
[0.0013]	 [0.0014]	
Leader	literacy	 -0.0001	 0.0117	
	
[0.0372]	 [0.0411]	
Leader	social	capital	 0.0151	 0.0262	
	
[0.0242]	 [0.0249]	
Leader	household	head	 -0.0428	 -0.0407	
	
[0.0576]	 [0.0571]	
%	Bambara	speakers	by	village	
	
-0.0805	
	 	
[0.0548]	
%	Crime	by	village	
	
-0.1856	
	 	
[0.1811]	
%	Organizations,	participation	by	village	
	
-0.0213	
	 	
[0.0567]	
Cercle	dummies	
	
Yes	
Constant	 0.6645***	 0.7244***	
	
[0.0931]	 [0.1270]	
	 	 	Observations	 2,784	 2,784	
R-squared	 0.0048	 0.0192	
Clustered	standard	errors	in	brackets,	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1.	
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Table	7:	Effect	of	leader’s	contribution	and	beliefs	at	base	round	on	contributions	in	the	leader	round		
	
Dependent	Variable		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
Contribution	in	the	leader	round	
	 	 	 	 	 			 		 		 		 		 		 		
Leader’s	contribution	at	base	game	 0.0873**	 0.0715*	 0.0778**	
	 	 	
	
[0.0370]	 [0.0389]	 [0.0387]	
	 	 	Leader’s	belief	at	base	game	
	 	 	
0.1128***	 0.0965***	 0.0958**	
	 	 	 	
[0.0353]	 [0.0355]	 [0.0370]	
%	Bambara	speakers	by	village	
	 	
0.0085	
	 	
-0.0006	
	 	 	
[0.0578]	
	 	
[0.0590]	
%	Crime	by	village	
	 	
0.2777*	
	 	
0.2583*	
	 	 	
[0.1431]	
	 	
[0.1426]	
%	Organizations,	participation	by	village	
	 	
-0.0516	
	 	
-0.0520	
	 	 	
[0.0510]	
	 	
[0.0499]	
%	Social	capital	by	village	
	
0.1173*	 0.1316*	
	
0.1170**	 0.1266*	
	 	
[0.0593]	 [0.0668]	
	
[0.0568]	 [0.0657]	
Cercle	dummies	
	 	
Yes	
	 	
Yes	
Constant	 0.7438***	 0.4172**	 0.3616	 0.7326***	 0.4061**	 0.3754*	
	
[0.0319]	 [0.1685]	 [0.2220]	 [0.0309]	 [0.1664]	 [0.2181]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	Observations	 2,797	 2,797	 2,797	 2,797	 2,797	 2,797	
R-squared	 0.0100	 0.0166	 0.0274	 0.0121	 0.0187	 0.0280	
Clustered	robust	standard	errors	in	brackets,	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1.	
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Table	8:		Effect	of	leader’s	contribution	and	beliefs	at	base	round	on	beliefs	in	the	leader	round	
	
Dependent	Variable		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
Beliefs	in	the	leader	round	
	 	 	 	 	 			 		 		 		 		 		 		
Leader’s	contribution	at	base	game	 0.0513	 0.0374	 0.0452	
	 	 	
	
[0.0338]	 [0.0335]	 [0.0323]	
	 	 	Leader’s	belief	at	base	game	
	 	 	
0.1720***	 0.1619***	 0.1677***	
	 	 	 	
[0.0396]	 [0.0388]	 [0.0392]	
%	Bambara	speakers	by	village	
	 	
-0.0387	
	 	
-0.0503	
	 	 	
[0.0530]	
	 	
[0.0492]	
%	Crime	by	village	
	 	
-0.0802	
	 	
-0.0944	
	 	 	
[0.1664]	
	 	
[0.1690]	
%	Organizations,	participation	by	
village	
	 	
-0.0182	
	 	
0.0143	
	 	 	
[0.0524]	
	 	
[0.0533]	
%	Social	capital	by	village	
	
0.1023	 0.1258**	
	
0.0724	 0.0902	
	 	
[0.0622]	 [0.0603]	
	
[0.0580]	 [0.0557]	
Cercle	dummies	
	 	
Yes	
	 	
Yes	
Constant	 0.7291***	 0.4443**	 0.4137**	 0.6540***	 0.4520***	 0.4140**	
	
[0.0288]	 [0.1807]	 [0.2012]	 [0.0331]	 [0.1722]	 [0.1857]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	Observations	 2,784	 2,784	 2,784	 2,784	 2,784	 2,784	
R-squared	 0.0044	 0.0107	 0.0268	 0.0357	 0.0389	 0.0533	
Clustered	standard	errors	at	the	village	level	in	brackets,	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1.	
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Table	9:		Effect	of	Community	Led	Total	Sanitation	on	contributions	and	beliefs	
	
Dependent	Variables		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	
	
Contributions	 Contributions	 Beliefs	 Beliefs	
	 		 		 		 		
Treatment	 0.0323	 0.0478*	 0.0450*	 0.0510*	
	
[0.0276]	 [0.0269]	 [0.0263]	 [0.0258]	
Discussion	round	 0.0777***	 0.0777***	 0.0561***	 0.0560***	
	
[0.0143]	 [0.0143]	 [0.0131]	 [0.0131]	
Leader	round	 0.0930***	 0.0930***	 0.0748***	 0.0748***	
	
[0.0150]	 [0.0150]	 [0.0127]	 [0.0127]	
%	Bambara	speakers	by	village	
	
-0.0524	
	
-0.0643	
	 	
[0.0402]	
	
[0.0448]	
%	Crime	by	village	
	
0.1561	
	
0.0218	
	 	
[0.1189]	
	
[0.1493]	
%	Organizations,	participation	by	village	
	
-0.1107**	
	
-0.0626	
	 	
[0.0454]	
	
[0.0448]	
Cercle	dummies	
	
Yes	
	
Yes	
Constant	 0.6968***	 0.8013***	 0.6684***	 0.7835***	
	
[0.0205]	 [0.0568]	 [0.0202]	 [0.0600]	
	 	 	 	 	Observations	 8,392	 8,392	 8,341	 8,341	
R-squared	 0.0108	 0.0224	 0.0117	 0.0193	
Clustered	standard	errors	in	brackets,	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1.	
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Figure	1:	Contributions	in	the	base,	discussion	and	leader	treatment.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure	2:	Gain	in	contributions	in	discussion	and	leader	treatments	compared	to	base	
treatment.	
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Figure	3:	Beliefs	in	base,	discussion	and	leader	treatments.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure	4:	Contributions	and	beliefs	in	the	three	treatments.	
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Figure	A.1:Timeline	for	the	CLTS	intervention
April-June	2011 September	2011-June	2012 April-June	2013
Baseline	activities Intervention Follow	up	activities
Surveys in	treated	communities Surveys
Games Games
Figure	A.2:Timeline	for	experimental	sessions
Investment	game
1)	Base	Round,	no	
communication,						
2)	Beliefs	
elicitation	in	base	
round					
3)Discussion	
(leader)	round				
4)Beliefs	elicitation	
in	discussion	
(leader)	round	
5)Leader	
(discussion)	round	
6)Beliefs	elicitation	
in	leader	
(discussion)	round
Experimenters	
explain	the	
game	to	the	
players
Q&A	
session	to	
make	sure	
the	game	is	
understood
Ranking	
Game
Revelation	of	
contributions	
to	foroba	in	
each	round
Rewards	
are	offered	
privately	to	
each	player
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Table	A1:	Composition	of	the	experimenters	team
Recruiter	(Recruter-Installateur):	Individual	in	charge	of	going	
through	households	and	conditioning	the	place	set	for	the	games.
Facilitator	(Animateur):	Individual	explaining	the	games	to	players
Accountant	(Comptable):	Individual	in	charge	of	counting	the	
contributions	and	calculating	the	rewards
Observer	(Observateur):	Individual	taking	notes	on	specific	features	
of	the	games	such	as	players	comments	or	unusual	circumstances
Supervisor	(Superviseur):	Individual	in	charge	of	overlooking	the	
team	of	experimenters
